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Simulation models of stylized oil sands projects that include detailed representations of 
different royalty and tax regimes are developed. These models are then used to examine 
the distribution between developers and governments of net returns associated with the 
development and production of Alberta’s oil sands deposits. A specific focus is to assess 
the estimated effects on the level and distribution of net revenues associated with a 
number of changes in assumed revenue and expenditure conditions. The results suggest 
that developers, and especially surface mine operators, typically bear a greater share of 
the consequences of variations in capital expenditures than they do of changes in 
operating expenditures, prices, and exchange rates. A comparison across royalty and tax 
regimes suggests, among other things, that there is a positive relationship between the 
level of net revenues estimated to accrue to either developers or governments and the 
share of the consequences of changes in revenue and expenditure conditions borne by 
that party. Some differences in royalty and tax treatment and the distribution of the 
consequences of changes in revenue and expenditure conditions are noted across 
production technologies. It is also clear that the role of the federal government as a fiscal 
player in oil sands development has shrunk over time. In contrast, under the regime 
currently in effect, the Government of Alberta captures a higher share of net returns and 
typically bears a greater proportion of the consequences of changes in conditions than at 
any time since the introduction of an explicit oil sands royalty and tax regime in 1997. 
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1.  Introduction 
In many parts of the world, including Alberta, royalties and taxes shape the distribution between 
developers/producers and governments of net returns generated by the development and production of 
crude oil reserves. By extension, changes in royalties and taxes alter how the consequences of “shocks” to 
revenue and cost conditions are distributed between producers and governments. In jurisdictions (such as 
Alberta) where governments act as agents for the resource owners, this amounts to asking how royalties 
and taxes affect the distribution of cost and price risks between developers/producers and 
governments/owners. The key objective of this paper is to address these issues in the context of the 
development and production of Alberta’s oil sands and to provide some assessment of the implications for 
risk sharing of the changes in royalty and tax provisions that have occurred since 1997. The analysis 
proceeds in three steps. First, computer simulation models are used to obtain estimates of the level and 
distribution of the net present value generated by oil sands operations for a range of oil prices. These 
results and those obtained from a series of revenue and expenditure “shocks” are then used to derive 
estimates of the distribution of the consequences of these shocks between developers and governments. 
Finally, the implications for the governments of Alberta and Canada are assessed separately. The analysis 
highlights differences in estimated effects across technologies, shocks, and royalty and tax regimes. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief outline of the context 
in which oil sands development has occurred in Alberta. Particular attention is paid to the evolution of the 
royalty and tax regime over the last decade. The simulation models used in the analysis are described in 
                                                 
1 This is a revised and extended version of: “Developing Alberta’s Oil Sands: Who Bears the Risk?”, prepared for 
presentation at the 28
th USAEE/IAEE North American conference (New Orleans, 3-5 December 2008); the original 
version is included in the online conference proceedings. The financial support of the University of Alberta’s Centre 
for Applied Business Research on Energy and the Environment (CABREE) is gratefully acknowledged. I also want 
to thank the Alberta Departments of Energy and of Finance and Enterprise for granting me permission to use some 
of the information on which this paper is based; my thanks as well to Fedja Lazarevic who provided excellent 
research assistance. Comments received in the course of presentations at the University of Alberta, the Department 
of Finance Canada, the Colorado School of Mines, and the 2
nd International Workshop on Empirical Methods in 
Energy Economics were very helpful in revision. All remaining errors and omissions are my responsibility.   2
section 3. The base cases used in the subsequent comparisons are developed in section 4. The specific 
cost and price “shocks” considered are outlined in section 5, which also reports estimates of the 
distribution between producers and the two governments combined of the effects of these shocks and 
includes a discussion of the main results obtained. A separate sub-section then considers how these effects 
are distributed between the governments of Alberta and Canada. A brief statement of conclusions closes 
the paper.  
 
2.  Developing Alberta’s Oil Sands: The Context
2 
As far as natural resources are concerned, Canadian constitutional arrangements are quite clear: 
with few exceptions, ownership rights are vested in the provinces in which these resources are located. In 
Alberta, as is the case in Canada generally, these rights have mostly not been alienated.
3 This means that 
the provincial government acts as agent for the resource “owners” – the residents of the relevant province. 
Both levels of government have the authority to collect revenues from the exploitation of natural 
resources, but when these are located within provincial boundaries, the government of that province also 
acts to secure a return for the owners through the design and implementation of royalties and taxes.  
Over the years, the Government of Alberta has come to rely on four instruments to collect 
revenues and thus secure a return to ownership from the development and production of natural gas and 
crude oil (including oil sands) reserves located in the province. One-time bonus bids result from the lease 
auctions used to allocate production rights to developers. The province also collects royalties on 
production and annual rentals, land-related payments of almost negligible size in Alberta.
4 A corporate 
income tax (CIT) is also levied on the revenues earned by all for-profit companies in the province, 
including those in the oil sands industry. The federal government also imposes a CIT on all for-profit 
                                                 
2 More detailed discussions of the evolution of Canada’s oil sands industry are available in Atkins and MacFadyen 
(2008) and National Energy Board (NEB; 2000, chapter 3). 
3 In the case of Alberta’s oil sands, for example, ownership rights to approximately 97% of the remaining resource 
base are still publicly held (see Alberta Energy, 2006, p. 1-1). 
4 Property taxes, sales taxes, and similar levies are considered payments for services and are included in capital and 
operating expenditures in the analysis that follows.   3
companies operating in Canada, oil sands developers included. However, the revenues thus collected 
cannot be considered a return to ownership since, as noted earlier, such rights are vested in the province 
and not the federation.  
The structure and specific provisions of the royalty and tax regime applicable to oil sands have 
evolved since commercial production of the province’s huge deposits began in the mid-1960s, when the 
original Suncor (then called “Great Canada Oil Sands”) plant came on stream. Until the mid-1990s, the 
royalty provisions applicable to each development project were determined through one-on-one 
negotiations with the Government of Alberta. This ad hoc approach to the determination of royalties was 
a source of uncertainty for developers as the commercial viability of potential projects underwent 
assessment. In an effort to address this uncertainty and to spur the development of the oil sands, the 
provincial and federal governments sponsored a joint task force with industry to address these concerns. 
Drawing on the work of Garnault and Clunies-Ross (1975) among others, the report of the National Oil 
Sands Task Force (1995) included a series of recommendations relating to royalties and taxes. Key among 
these was the notion of adopting a “generic” royalty and tax regime that would be applicable to all new 
development projects and that of designing the royalty system based on a “revenue minus cost” approach, 
in recognition of the high exploitation costs associated with oil sands production.  
Within a few years, the two governments had adopted and implemented many of the Task Force’s 
recommendations. A generic regime, designed to apply to all future projects and embodying  a “revenue 
minus cost” approach to the determination of royalties, was in effect by 1997. As noted in Table 1 (under 
“1997 Generic”), a small base royalty would be payable until project payout; thereafter, the greater of the 
base royalty or a net revenue royalty would be remitted by the producer. Project payout would be said to 
have occurred when cumulated revenues first exceeded cumulated capital and operating expenditures 
(including base royalties and rentals), all summed over time using the long-term government bond rate as 
interest/return allowance.  
As far as CIT was concerned, the two governments picked up on another recommendation made 
by the National Oil Sands Task Force and allowed the favorable tax treatment extended to Canada’s   4
mining industry to apply to all new oil sands projects and to major expansions of existing operations, in 
recognition of the very large up-front capital expenditures that characterize such activities. Specifically, 
“accelerated capital cost allowance” (ACCA) provisions meant that most capital expenditures associated 
with oil sands developments could be claimed at a rate of 100% (i.e., expensed)  against income from 
individual projects for CIT purposes.  
Over the next decade, the royalty provisions remained unchanged. However, both governments 
brought in a series of modifications to the corporate income tax; the three key changes made between 
1997 and mid-2007 are noted in Table 1 (under “2007 Generic”). Both federal and provincial CIT rates 
were lowered, the treatment of royalties in the determination of taxable income was altered, and the 
federal government brought to an end the favorable treatment extended to oil sands investments: the 
federal portion of the ACCA provisions was eliminated.
5 
By the end of 2006, the royalty and tax regime applicable to oil and gas production had become a 
political issue in Alberta. A period of sustained higher energy prices led some (e.g., Taylor and Reynolds, 
2006) to express concerns about the share of net returns from development and production accruing to 
owners. The Government of Alberta responded by appointing an expert panel to assess the structure of 
royalties and taxes levied on all oil and gas production in the province, including oil sands operations. 
Shortly after the panel completed its report (Alberta Royalty Review Panel, 2007a), the provincial 
government announced its intention to implement a series of changes to the royalty and tax provisions 
(Government of Alberta, 2007c). As far as oil sands operations are concerned, key modifications put 
forward and later implemented included proposals to increase royalty rates and to make these sensitive to 
changes in the (nominal) Canadian-dollar price of WTI, and the elimination of the provincial portion of 
the ACCA provisions, as indicated under “New Royalty Framework (NRF)” in Table 1. 
In 2007, Alberta also introduced legislation dealing with greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which 
is particularly relevant for the case at hand, given the emissions-intensive nature of oil sands production 
                                                 
5 Note the some of these modifications were phased in and were not fully in effect by the end of 2009. In the 
simulation work that follows, however, I have opted to focus on steady-state implications and thus assumed that all 
changes had been fully implemented by 2010, the first year of development activity in all of the simulations.   5
activities. The Climate Change and Emissions Management Act allows for GHG emissions reductions 
targets to be set and provides for payment into a provincially administered technology fund when the 
specified targets are not met. Regulations released under this Act (Government of Alberta, 2007b) provide 
for annual targets at the level of individual production facilities with total GHG emissions greater than 
100,000 tonnes and call for a payment of $15 into the technology fund for each tonne emitted in excess of 
the identified target.
6 Even though these measures are not linked to the Government of Alberta acting to 
secure revenues for the owners of the province’s oil sands resources, they are included as part of the NRF 
in the analysis that follows since they are clearly a government-imposed cost for producers and result in 
additional revenues flowing to the Government of Alberta. (For simplicity, in the work that follows, it is 
assumed that every year payment into the technology fund is made for each tonne of GHG emitted in 
excess of 100,000 tonnes.) 
The underlying objective of this paper is to shed some light on the consequences of these changes 
in royalty and tax provisions for the distribution of the cost and price risks associated with oil sands 
projects. 
 
3.  Simulation Models: Design and Key Assumptions 
The simulation models used in this paper are versions of those described in Plourde (2009) for a 
surface mining operation and for an in situ production plant (specifically, a steam-assisted gravity 
drainage, or SAGD, facility).
7 The surface mining operation is modelled as located in Alberta’s 
northeastern Athabasca region, where all of the deposits that can be produced with this type of technology 
are located. The model SAGD plant is assumed situated further south, in the Cold Lake area.  
Key assumptions for both types of projects are summarized in Table 2.
8 As with Plourde (2009), 
capital and non-energy operating expenditures are taken from the work of the Alberta Royalty Review 
                                                 
6 Unless otherwise specified, monetary values are expressed in units of Canadian currency. 
7 Non-technical descriptions of these bitumen production technologies can be found in NEB (2000, chapter 4). 
8 Note that exploration expenditures are typically a very small part of the overall costs of oil sands activities since 
the location of the reserves are known and the deposits have been extensively mapped by government agencies.   6
Panel (2007a, b). In terms of energy-related operating expenditures, it is assumed, as in McColl and 
Slagorsky (2008, p. 29), that each barrel of bitumen produced by a SAGD facility requires inputs of 10 
kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity and 1.065 gigajoules (GJ) of natural gas.
9 For the surface mine, the 
analysis focuses on bitumen production, and thus co-generation opportunities leading to sales of surplus 
electricity into the grid are not considered. As a result, the comparable energy input quantities are 12 kWh 
and 0.264 GJ, respectively, in line with assumptions made in Alberta Royalty Review Panel (2007a, b). 
As far as the implications for greenhouse gas emissions are concerned, the use of each GJ of natural gas is 
assumed to produce 51.36 kilograms of CO2, as is the case in McColl and Slagorsky (2008, p. 28). 
The construction and operation of both types of oil sands production facilities modelled are 
assumed to require both domestically produced and imported inputs; for simplicity, the latter are treated 
as priced in units of US currency. The relevant proportions of imported inputs are taken from Timilsina et 
al. (2005), where these are assumed to be higher for surface mining operations than for SAGD plants. The 
base-case exchange-rate assumption is that $(Cdn) 1 = $(US) 0.90, which is the forecast value used in the 
2009 budget of the Government of Alberta (Alberta Finance and Enterprise, 2009, p.86). 
As one might expect, the prices of crude oil, bitumen, electricity, and natural gas are not assumed 
to be independently determined. Instead, the most recent five years (September 2004 to August 2009) of 
available data are used to derive linkages across prices which are then incorporated into the models. The 
key underlying price in both models is that for WTI at Cushing (OK), which then drives the prices of all 
other energy commodities considered.  
In the case of natural gas, for example, between September 2004 and August 2009, the Canadian-
dollar spot price of a barrel of WTI delivered at Cushing was 12.2 times the spot price of natural gas in 
Alberta.
10 As a consequence, the price of natural gas paid by oil sands operators is assumed to be linked to 
that of WTI by a factor of 12-to-1: the price in Alberta of one GJ of natural gas is set at 8.33% of the 
                                                 
9 I am grateful to the Canadian Energy Research Institute for making a copy of McColl and Slagorsky (2008) 
available to me. 
10 WTI prices were taken from US Energy Information Administration and converted into units of Canadian 
currency using monthly averages of the noon spot exchange rate, available from Statistics Canada. Natural 
Resources Canada is the source for natural gas prices.   7
Canadian-dollar price of a barrel of WTI. Together with the exchange rate identified above, this 
relationship yields a natural gas price of approximately $6.50 when the WTI price is assumed to be $(US) 
70 per barrel (a price level similar to that prevailing at the time of writing). 
In light of the operations of Alberta’s restructured electricity market (where wholesale prices are 
most often set by gas-fired generation), electricity prices are, in turn, tied to natural gas prices.
11 Over the 
period identified earlier, the wholesale price of one megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity in Alberta was 
10.9 times the spot price of one GJ of natural gas in the province.
12 As a result, the unit price of electricity 
is assumed to be eleven times that of natural gas. At an assumed price of $(US) 70, the resulting natural 
gas price of $6.50 per GJ thus yields electricity priced at approximately $71.30 per MWh. 
As per Alberta Royalty Review Panel (2007a, b), Cold Lake bitumen prices are set at 55% of 
those for WTI; the corresponding value applicable to Athabasca production is 45%, to reflect the further 
distance to key consumption markets, including the fact that pipeline transportation requires bitumen to 
be combined either with synthetic crude oil (that is, upgraded bitumen) or another diluent such as 
condensate. This kind of price differential between bitumen and light crude oil prices is consistent with 
the experience of the last number of years. Alberta’s Energy Resources Conservation Board collects 
monthly price information for various qualities of crude oil. According to these data, between September 
2004 and August 2009, bitumen prices measured at Cold Lake averaged 56% of the spot price of WTI (at 
Cushing, OK) expressed in units of Canadian currency.
13 
The models also include detailed representations of the three royalty and tax regimes outlined in 
the previous section. The experience in Alberta has been that bonus bids are rather small relative to the 
net revenues generated by oil sands projects: typically not much more than one year’s worth of base 
royalty payments. The approach adopted here is designed to ensure that bonus bids are not underestimated 
                                                 
11 Linkages between Alberta electricity and natural gas prices since the onset of electricity market restructuring in 
the province are explored in Liang (2009). 
12 Natural gas prices are again those from Natural Resources Canada, while Alberta Electric System Operator is the 
source for electricity prices. 
13 Calculations are based on the WTI price data described earlier and bitumen prices taken from various issues of 
ERCB publication ST-3: Alberta Energy Resources Industries Monthly Statistics.   8
in the analysis. Specifically, at a bitumen price of $40 per barrel, the bonus bid, in the case of SAGD, is 
set on the basis of the size (in hectares) of the first phase of a specific project that has recently come on 
stream (the 72,000-barrels-per-day Opti-Nexen venture at Long Lake) and the highest average per-hectare 
bonus bid recorded for oil sands leases in any given year (some $1273 per hectare, realized in 2006, 
according to statistics available on the Alberta Department of Energy website: 
www.energy.gov.ab.ca/OilSands/1236.asp ). This yields a bonus bid of approximately $9 million, which 
is assumed to vary proportionately with bitumen prices. As far as surface mining operations are 
concerned, the bonus bid is assumed to be four times that for the SAGD plant for any given bitumen 
price, consistent with the relative size of the total output of the two projects over their assumed lifetimes, 
as indicated in Table 2. 
Finally, note that a real discount rate of 7% is used in all present value calculations. The general 
rate of price inflation is assumed to be 2.2% in every year of the simulation periods, as in McColl and 
Slagorsky (2008). 
 
4.  Establishing a Baseline for Comparison: Oil Sands Operations at Different Price Levels 
  The models are first used to obtain estimates of the net present value (NPV) generated by the two 
types of operations at different WTI prices. Figure 1 reports estimated (real, discounted) per-barrel costs 
and revenues for the stylized SAGD plant and the surface mine calculated at various real WTI prices that 
are in turn assumed to remain constant over the entire life of the operations. Figure 2 provides 
representations of the associated (real, discounted) NPVs generated by these two types of projects. 
  The added per-barrel revenues conferred on SAGD operations due to their locational advantage 
are quite evident in Figure 1. It is also clear that, despite the assumed linkages between the price of WTI 
and those of energy inputs, per-barrel revenues are estimated to rise much faster than per-barrel costs as 
real WTI prices are allowed to increase. Indeed, while the real price of a barrel of bitumen rises by a 
factor of five over the range of WTI prices considered, per-barrel costs increase by about 80% for SAGD 
and 20% for the surface mine. The results also suggest that both types of projects can at best be   9
considered marginal commercial propositions – even in the absence of any royalties and taxes – at real 
WTI prices of less than $(US) 50 per barrel. This is confirmed by Figure 2, where estimated total costs 
and NPVs are presented for both types of operations. As one would expect, surface mines produce much 
more bitumen over their lifetimes than do SAGD plants, but these results remind us that the total 
expenditures needed to sustain this greater production are also much higher. Finally, since the focus of 
this paper is on the distribution of the estimated consequences of selected revenue and expenditure shocks 
and not on the underlying commercial viability of the hypothetical projects considered, minimum baseline  
real WTI prices are set at $(US) 50 per barrel in the analysis that follows.  
  Figures 3a and 3b present the producer shares of the NPVs obtained from model simulations 
incorporating the three royalty and tax regimes described in section 2 for real WTI prices varying between 
$(US) 50 and $(US) 120.
14 The consequences of the changes in the royalty and tax regimes are quite 
evident: taken together, the CIT modifications that occurred between 1998 and 2007 were clearly 
favorable to producers, while the provisions of the NRF are estimated to be such as to capture for 
governments a share of the net present value that is more in line with that obtained under the generic 
regime as introduced in 1997. The consequences of the price sensitivity of royalty rates under the NRF 
are more clearly evident in the case of the SAGD plant (Figure 3a): as WTI prices rise and bring about 
higher royalty rates, the NPV share accruing to producers falls, all else held equal. This effect disappears 
once assumed real WTI prices are high enough to ensure that the highest royalty rates are in effect 
throughout the productive life of the project. Figure 3a shows that, under baseline assumptions, this 
occurs at real (2010) prices of approximately $(US) 90 per barrel. Also, as discussed in Plourde (2009), 
the combination of the higher capital intensity of surface mining operations and the royalty and tax 
treatment of capital expenditures under all three regimes is primarily responsible for the lower NPV share 
accruing to surface mine producers, especially at lower WTI prices. 
 
                                                 
14 Of course, the NPV share accruing to the two governments (Alberta and federal) combined is (1 – producer 
share), by construction.   10
5.  Changes in Revenue and Expenditure Conditions 
5.1 Revenue and Expenditure Shocks: Description and Effects on Per-barrel NPVs 
  For both stylized SAGD and surface mining operations, the estimated effects of six pairs of 
revenue and expenditure “shocks” on the NPVs reported in section 4 were obtained. Specifically, 5% 
increases and decreases from baseline values are assessed for each of the following factors: 
o  real price of bitumen (“+5% BIT” and “-5% BIT” in the text and figures that follow); 
o  real price of  WTI (“+5% WTI” and “-5% WTI”); 
o  value of the Canadian dollar relative to the US dollar (“+5% C,US$” and “-5% C,US$”); 
o  real capital expenditures (“+5% K exp” and “-5% K exp”); 
o  real price of natural gas (“+5% Gas” and “-5% Gas”); and  
o  real non-energy operating expenditures (“+5% Op exp” and “-5% Op exp”).  
 
Note that shocks to WTI prices flow through to the prices of bitumen, natural gas, and electricity 
according to the linkages described above. Similarly, changes in natural gas prices are allowed to affect 
electricity prices. However, shocks to bitumen prices apply only to these prices, with the result that their 
relationship with WTI prices then differs from that described in section 3. 
  Figures 4a and 4b (both drawn to the same scale to facilitate comparisons) summarize the 
simulation results for the level of per-barrel NPV at a real WTI price of $(US) 70 without any attention 
paid to the distribution of the effects between producers and governments. At this WTI price and in the 
absence of any of the shocks outlined above, the stylized SAGD plant is estimated to generate a (real, 
discounted) net present value of approximately $24 for each barrel of bitumen produced over its lifetime. 
For the surface mine, the corresponding figure is about $16.25. 
By construction, both models yield results that are quite symmetric: in general, an x% increase in 
a given cost or revenue factor tends to yield the same level effect, in absolute value terms, as an x% 
decrease in the same factor. As one would expect in light of the results reported in section 4, revenue 
shocks are estimated to have greater effects on NPVs than are changes in costs/expenditures of the same 
relative magnitude. Although not evident from the figures, none of the shocks considered is sufficiently 
large to yield estimated negative NPVs (either for the projects as a whole, or for producers in particular), 
even at real WTI prices of $(US) 50 per barrel.   11
  Note that, as outlined above, changes in the price of WTI (whether effected directly or through 
assumed variations in the value of the Canadian dollar) will bring about partially offsetting changes in 
two cost factors: the prices of natural gas and electricity. There are no such induced cost effects when 
bitumen prices are assumed to vary, all else (including WTI prices) held equal. This explains why Figures 
4a and 4b show a greater sensitivity of NPVs to bitumen price variations than to equi-proportionate 
changes in WTI prices. 
The figures also show differences across technologies in the simulated consequences of some of 
the shocks considered. In particular, surface mining operations tend to be less sensitive to exchange rate 
variations than are SAGD plants. This is largely due to the fact that surface mines are more capital 
intensive and that, in turn, capital expenditures associated with this technology have a higher assumed 
import content, as shown in Table 2. As a result, the revenue-reducing effects of an appreciation of the 
Canadian dollar (relative to its US counterpart), for example, are countered by an associated reduction in 
the Canadian-dollar value of the required capital expenditures. As far as oil sands operations are 
concerned, an exchange-rate shock will thus set in motion a partially offsetting capital-expenditure shock, 
and the degree of offset is here shown to be larger for surface mines than for SAGD plants. 
  It is also clear from Figures 4a and 4b that changes in the price of natural gas have 
proportionately larger effects on the estimated NPVs of SAGD plants, while shocks to non-energy 
operating expenditures are of relatively greater significance for surface mining operations. The much 
greater reliance on natural gas that characterizes the SAGD production process (noted in Table 2) is at the 
heart of these differences across technologies. 
 
5.2 Revenue and Expenditure Shocks: Who Pays? 
  Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c show the share of the estimated changes in SAGD-plant NPVs that are 
borne by producers under the three royalty and tax regimes considered. Figures 6a, 6b, and 6c do the 
same for the surface mine, as modelled. The focus here is on the effects of “negative shocks” (i.e., those 
that bring about reduced NPVs), but the simulation results (not reported) also indicate that the producer-  12
government distributions of the consequences of “positive shocks” are quite similar to those shown in 
these figures. 
  Since the interpretation of the results reported in these figures can be a bit tricky, it might be 
useful to consider an example. Take the situation depicted in Figure 5c for the case of “+5% K exp” at a 
real price of $(US) 75. The simulations suggest that, under these circumstances, the provisions of the 
NRF will result in producers bearing approximately 60% of the NPV reduction due to a 5% increase in 
capital expenditures associated with a SAGD plant. By extension, therefore, these results suggest that the 
two governments combined would bear 40% of this NPV reduction. 
  For all royalty and tax regimes considered, there are instances where, as real WTI prices increase, 
sudden reductions in the estimated effect on the NPV accruing to producers are equally suddenly 
reversed. (See for example Figure 6a, “+5% K exp” between WTI prices of $(US) 85 and $(US) 95.) 
These “blips” are due to endogenous changes in the timing of project payout. All else held equal, at a 
given WTI price the effects of individual shocks are sometimes large enough to delay project payout into 
the next year of the simulation period – effects which are amplified by the time preference implicit in the 
present-value calculations. 
  The simulation results suggest that, as far as the distribution of the effects between producers and 
governments are concerned, there are effectively two types of shocks under 1997 Generic and 2007 
Generic: changes in capital expenditures and all others considered. This simply highlights the fact that the 
design of these two royalty and tax regimes treats all changes in revenue and expenditure conditions in a 
similar manner, with the only exception of capital expenditures where producers are called upon 
systematically to bear a greater share of the consequences of shocks. Producers bear more of any capital 
expenditure increases (and also get to keep a greater proportion of any reduction in such expenditures) 
because the provisions of the CIT and those of the net revenue royalty allow for less-than-full expensing 
of this type of expenditures in the year in which these are undertaken (or equivalent treatment through 
depreciation allowances). The results also indicate that these differences are even more pronounced in the 
case of the more capital-intensive surface mine.   13
  The consequences of the NRF’s price-sensitive royalty structure are also clearly evident from the 
figures. In particular, anything that affects the Canadian-dollar price of WTI will, for some range of 
prices, induce changes in base and net revenue royalty rates – something that no other shock considered 
can do. This means that under the NRF changes in WTI prices and in the value of the Canadian dollar 
create a third type of shock, with different implications in terms of the distribution between producers and 
governments of their effects. As Figures 5c and 6c indicate, the simulation results show that producers 
bear a smaller proportion of such shocks than of all other types considered: the NRF thus provides 
additional insulation for producers against the consequences of appreciations of the Canadian dollar and 
reductions in WTI prices, which also means that a greater proportion of the additional returns due to any 
depreciation of the dollar or WTI price increases will accrue to governments. Note as well that under the 
NRF the offsetting effects in terms of capital expenditures set in motion by changes in the value of the 
Canadian dollar also have greater distributional consequences than under the other regimes considered. 
As evident in Figure 6c, these consequences are even more pronounced in the case of the surface mine: at 
lower WTI prices, surface mine producers face a smaller proportion of the effects of exchange-rate 
variations than do SAGD operators.  
More generally, there are no great differences across technologies as to the distribution of the 
consequences of almost all of the shocks considered. Here again, a key exception has to do with capital 
expenditures, where surface mine producers are estimated to bear a greater share of the effects of capital-
expenditure shocks than do SAGD producers, and this for all WTI prices considered. Differences across 
royalty and tax regimes, however, are more pronounced. An examination of the various panels of Figures 
5 and 6 in light of the results depicted in Figures 3a and 3b reveals that the share of the consequences of 
the shocks estimated to be borne by producers is directly related to the share of the NPV accruing to 
producers under baseline assumptions. Producers are thus most exposed to the effects of shocks under 
2007 Generic (the system estimated to yield the highest net returns to producers for any given set of 
conditions), and most insulated against these effects under 1997 Generic, with the treatment extended by 
the provisions of the NRF falling somewhere in between the other regimes, but closer to that offered by   14
the latter. Given this pattern of results, one question that arises relates to how the incidence of the effects 
of shocks compares to the distribution of the NPVs generated under baseline assumptions. In an effort to 
shed some light on this issue, the ratios of the producer share of the consequences of the shocks to the 
producer share of baseline NPVs were generated for both projects. These ratios are shown in Figures 7a, 
7b, and 7c for a representative set of shocks.
15 First, note that differences across technologies are more 
evident here than in the results reported in the previous sub-section, especially at lower WTI prices. 
Specifically, surface mine producers are shown to be more exposed to the effects of shocks than are 
SAGD producers, when assessed relative to the share of project NPVs accruing to them. On a similar 
note, differences across royalty and tax regimes are also noticeable at lower WTI prices, with higher 
ratios typically associated with 1997 Generic and NRF. The changes in producer NPVs resulting from the 
type of revenue and expenditure shocks considered tend to be proportionately larger in relation to baseline 
NPVs under these two regimes than under 2007 Generic.  
Note as well that in almost every case considered, this ratio exceeds one: to varying degrees – and 
especially at lower WTI prices, producers bear a greater proportion of the consequences of shocks than 
the share of the project NPVs estimated to accrue to them under baseline conditions. In some sense, 
therefore, the share of revenue and expenditure “risk” borne by producers is typically estimated to be 
larger than their share of baseline project NPVs. Negative shocks not only reduce NPVs, but also bring 
about lower producer shares of project net returns. Correspondingly, however, positive shocks are 
estimated to result in both higher net returns and higher NPV shares accruing to producers. And this 
pattern of results can be seen to hold for all three royalty and tax regimes considered. The only exception 
has to do with the consequences of an exchange-rate shock under the NRF. Here, for some range of 
(relatively low) WTI prices, the ratio under discussion is less than one for both surface mine and 
                                                 
15 All three figures are drawn to the same scale to facilitate comparisons. The ratios associated with shocks to 
bitumen prices and non-energy expenditures are almost identical to those for changes in natural gas prices (Figure 
7a). Results for WTI price shocks are similar to those for exchange-rate variations (Figure 7b), but tend to show 
slightly smaller values, as one would expect given the discussion in sub-sections 5.1 and 5.2.   15
(especially) SAGD producers. In such cases, producers thus stand to bear a smaller proportion of 
exchange-rate risk than their share of project NPV under baseline assumptions. 
For almost all of the shocks considered (including changes in the Canada-US exchange rate), the 
kinds of differences discussed in the previous two paragraphs are greatly attenuated at higher WTI prices. 
For both technologies and under all three royalty and tax regimes considered, the ratios described above 
approach one in value. For sufficiently high WTI prices, the distribution of the consequences of revenue 
and expenditure shocks between producers and governments is thus quite similar to the distribution of 
project NPVs between these two parties.  
Figure 7c reminds us again that the treatment extended to capital expenditures is quite different to 
that applicable to other revenue and expenditure factors, under all three royalty and tax regimes and 
especially as far as surface mine operations are concerned. At lower WTI prices, producers are much 
more exposed to capital expenditure shocks in both absolute terms (as noted in the previous sub-section) 
and relative to the share of project NPVs accruing to them, as a comparison of Figure 7c to the other two 
panels of Figure 7 reveals. Furthermore, in contrast to all other shocks considered, producers remain 
relatively more exposed to capital expenditure variations at higher WTI prices: ratios of the producer 
share of estimated NPV changes to the producer share of baseline NPVs remain well above one, even at 
the highest WTI prices considered. 
 
5.3 Treating Federal and Provincial Governments Separately 
  To this point, the analysis has focused on the distribution of estimated net returns associated with 
hypothetical oil sands developments between producers and governments. As noted earlier, however, both 
the governments of Alberta and of Canada collect revenues from oil sands operations.
16 This section 
extends the analysis by considering the position of each government separately. Two specific questions 
                                                 
16 As noted in section 2, under Canada’s Constitution, ownership rights to natural resources (including crude oil and 
natural gas) are vested with the provinces in which these are located. Since these rights are still mostly publicly held, 
provincial governments act as agents for the resources owners – the residents of each province. Returns to 
ownership generated by the development of oil sands deposits are thus closely aligned with the share of net returns 
accruing to the Government of Alberta (especially since only about 11% of Canadians live in Alberta).   16
are addressed: first, how have the changes in royalty and tax provisions altered the distribution of the 
government share of net returns and second, how do revenue and expenditure shocks separately affect the 
governments of Alberta and of Canada?  
  The results of efforts to address these questions for both SAGD and surface mining operations are 
presented in Figures 8a and 8b, for a real (2010) WTI price of $(US) 70. For purposes of comparison, the 
baseline simulation results for the distribution of NPVs among producers, the Government of Alberta 
(acting as agent of the resources owners), and the federal government are presented above “Base” in the 
two figures. The other columns present the distribution among these three parties of the effects of the 
representative shocks discussed in sub-section 5.2.  
  As noted earlier, producers typically bear a greater proportion of the NPV effects of the simulated 
shocks than the NPV shares estimated to accrue to them under baseline assumptions. This implies, of 
course, that both governments combined bear a relatively smaller share of the consequences of these 
shocks. Figures 8a and 8b show that this typically applies to the two governments separately: the 
governments of Alberta and of Canada each face a smaller share of the effects of shocks than their share 
of baseline project NPVs. The only exception to this pattern of results concerns the consequences of 
exchange rate shocks, with their induced effects on royalty rates and capital expenditures. Here, the 
effects on royalty payments are such that the Government of Alberta is estimated to bear a relatively 
greater proportion of the consequences of changes in the value of the Canadian dollar than either of the 
other two parties. 
  The simulation results also indicate that, under all three royalty and tax regimes and for both 
technologies modelled, the Government of Alberta is estimated to collect a greater share of the NPVs 
generated by oil sands development projects, but also bears a greater proportion of the effects of revenue 
and expenditure shocks, than does the federal government. These differences are especially pronounced 
under the NRF, where the share of the NPVs estimated to be generated by both SAGD and surface mine 
operations exceed that obtained under both of the other regimes modelled. Furthermore, the results for 
“Alberta” in Figures 8a and 8b indicate that, for both technologies, the estimated share of the effects of   17
changes in capital expenditures borne by the owners is similar under NRF and 1997 Generic, and 
somewhat larger than under 2007 Generic. In the case of the other revenue and expenditure shocks 
considered, the results suggest that the Government of Alberta is estimated to bear a greater share of their 
effect on NPVs under the NRF than is the case under either 1997 Generic or 2007 Generic. The royalty 
and tax provisions currently in effect are thus such that the owners, through the actions of their agent, 
clearly capture greater returns from oil sands development than do Canadians living in other provinces, 
and typically do so at the cost of bearing a greater part of the consequences of changes in underlying 
revenue and expenditure conditions.  
  For both technologies, the share of net returns from oil sands development estimated to accrue to 
the federal government is highest under 1997 Generic, and lowest under the NRF. The federal 
government is also most vulnerable to the effects of oil sands revenue and expenditure shocks under 1997 
Generic, while the provisions of the NRF least affect it. It is interesting to note that the position of the 
federal government is different under 2007 Generic and the NRF even though there are no federal policy 
differences between these two royalty and tax regimes. Instead, the changes in the federal position are due 
to differences in the Government of Alberta’s royalty provisions. As is clear from Table 1, royalties are 
higher under the NRF than under 2007 Generic, all else held equal. Since royalty payments are fully 
deductible in the calculation of corporate income taxes, a portion of the higher royalties estimated to be 
collected by the Government of Alberta under the NRF are effectively paid by the federal government in 
the form of foregone CIT revenues from oil sands development activities. While the higher royalties have 
a similar effect on Alberta’s CIT collections from oil sands producers, the revenue offset is less than full 
for the provincial government thus contributing to increasing the share of net returns captured by owners 
under the NRF. 
  As Figures 3a and 3b implicitly indicate, the combined government share of NPVs generated by 
both SAGD and surface mine operations is estimated to increase as real WTI prices are allowed to rise 
from $(US) 50 to $(US) 120. Much of the growth in government take is estimated to have occurred by the 
time real WTI prices reach about $(US) 90 per barrel, and that under all three royalty and tax regimes   18
considered. The only exception being the case of the SAGD plant under the NRF, where the share of 
NPVs accruing to governments falls as prices rise, again, to about $(US) 90. Simulation results not 
reported here show a similar pattern for both governments separately, with the price-induced changes in 
the Government of Alberta’s position being responsible for the differences in results observed for the 
SAGD plant under the NRF. 
  To the extent that the position of the federal government is affected by the shocks considered, the 
results suggest that it tends to vary inversely with WTI prices: the federal government tends to bear a 
slightly greater share of the consequences of these shocks at lower prices than it does when prices are 
higher. There are a few exceptions where the relationship is estimated to go in the other direction, but in 
all cases the changes in the federal share are small, with variations in this share being often less than one 
percentage point over the entire range of WTI prices considered. 
  The responsiveness of the Government of Alberta’s position with respect to the shocks 
considered also tends to be small under 1997 Generic and 2007 Generic, but stronger under the NRF. In 
general, the owners are less exposed to the consequences of shocks under all three royalty and tax regimes 
when real WTI prices are at the lower end of the range considered, while the reverse is true at higher 
prices. But again these effects tend to be relatively small (variations of less than one or two percentage 
points in Alberta’s share of the consequences of shocks) for the first two regimes, and much pronounced 
under the NRF where variations in this share can reach eight to ten percentage points as real WTI prices 
are allowed to rise from $(US) 50 to $(US) 120 per barrel. Here again, the price-sensitive royalty rates 
incorporated into the NRF have noticeable implications: at sufficiently high WTI prices, the share of the 
consequences of shocks to the exchange rate and to WTI prices that is the borne by the Government of 
Alberta begins to fall and, for both technologies, is eventually smaller than it is at the bottom end of the 
WTI price range considered.  
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6. Conclusion 
This paper has explored how royalty and tax provisions affect both the distribution of net returns 
and the distribution of revenue and expenditure “risk” associated with oil sands development activities. At 
the heart of the analytical work undertaken rest computer simulation models of stylized SAGD and 
surface mining operations that include detailed representations of three royalty and tax regimes of 
relevance to the development and production of Alberta’s oil sands since 1997. 
Overall, the results suggest that, all else held equal, there tends to be a direct relationship between 
the share of net returns to any one party (producers or governments, the latter either combined or 
separately) and that party’s exposure to the consequences of revenue and expenditure shocks. A royalty 
and tax regime, such as “2007 Generic” that typically yields higher shares of net returns to producers will 
also leave producers facing a greater share of the effects of changes in revenue and expenditure 
conditions. The share of net returns estimated to accrue to producers under the NRF is indeed smaller than 
under 2007 Generic, but so is typically the share of the consequences of revenue and expenditure shocks 
that they have to bear. 
The results also suggest that a characteristic of the three royalty and tax regimes considered is 
that, for a wide range of circumstances, producers are called upon to bear a larger share of the risk 
associated with revenue and expenditure shocks (in the sense that they shoulder a greater proportion of 
the resulting effects on NPVs) than the share of net returns that accrues to them in the absence of such 
shocks. The reverse is true for both provincial and federal governments individually under all three 
regimes: each bears a smaller share of the risk than the proportion of net project returns that it is estimated 
to capture in the absence of shocks. 
  Changes in the royalty and tax provisions that have occurred since 1997 have clearly decreased 
the importance of the federal government as a fiscal player in oil sands development. Indeed, under the 
three regimes considered in the analysis, the share of net returns accruing to the Government of Canada is 
estimated to be lowest under the New Royalty Framework (the regime in effect at the time of writing) as 
is its exposure to revenue and expenditure shocks. In contrast, the results suggest that the share of net   20
returns captured by the Government of Alberta would be highest under the NRF, as would the part of the 
effects of changes in revenue and expenditures typically borne by the “resource owners”. Indeed, owners 
are especially exposed to the effects of changes in WTI prices and in the Canada-US exchange rate due to 
the fact that royalty rates under the NRF are sensitive, over some range of values, to WTI prices 
expressed in units of Canadian currency. 
  Under the NRF, however, owners tend to be less exposed – and producers more exposed – to 
changes in revenue and expenditure conditions when WTI prices are relatively low, especially in the case 
of the more capital-intensive surface mine. The results thus suggest that the provisions of the NRF tend to 
make “expensive” projects (relative to the net returns generated) even riskier from the perspective of 
producers. This effect is estimated to be stronger in the case of capital expenditure shocks, where 
producers are called upon to bear a greater share – and owners a smaller share – of the effects than all 
other shocks considered. Once again, this is particularly relevant at relatively low WTI prices and in the 
case of the surface mine. In comparison to other types of expenditures, producers thus get to keep a 
greater proportion of any capital expenditure reduction effected, but also bear a greater proportion of any 
increase in capital expenditures experienced. This suggests that, all else held equal, capital expenditure 
control can be of greater value to producers than efforts directed at reducing other types of expenditures. 
  From a policy perspective, it seems reasonable to have producers bear a greater proportion of 
risks than do owners when the former are more readily in position to mitigate the effects of changes in 
underlying revenue and expenditure conditions. After all, producers are in much better position to affect 
expenditure levels than are the owners (or their agent, the Government of Alberta). On a similar note, it 
seems quite appropriate for owners to assume a greater share of the risks relating to factors over which oil 
sands producers have no control, such as the price of WTI and the value of the Canadian dollar, for 
example. A remaining question, however, and one that cannot be addressed with the tools used in this 
paper, deals with the degree to which this differentiated treatment is appropriate. 
  The provisions of the NRF are also estimated to leave SAGD producers with a larger share of net 
returns than that accruing to surface mine operators, especially at the lower end of the range of WTI   21
prices considered. While the simulations identified no marked differences across technologies in the 
proportion of the effects of revenue and expenditure shocks borne by producers, the combined effect of 
these two factors is that at lower WTI prices surface mine producers are estimated to bear a greater share 
of revenue and expenditure risks relative to the part of net revenues accruing to them. As a result, any 
given negative shock thus stands to eliminate a greater proportion of project net returns estimated to 
accrue to producers. 
  This pattern of results suggests that the provisions of the NRF arguably extend a more favorable 
treatment to SAGD operations than to surface mines, at least if both types of producers are risk-averse. 
From a policy perspective, this might well be a reasonable outcome since about 80% of Alberta’s 
remaining reserves of bitumen (and an even greater proportion of the in-place volumes) are thought to be 
producible only through the application of in situ techniques, such as steam-assisted gravity drainage.
17 
  In summary, what do these results imply for the revenue position of the Government of Alberta 
with respect to oil sands development? The results of model simulations reported above suggest that, 
under the NRF, the Government of Alberta stands to capture a greater share of the net returns associated 
with new oil sands development projects than under either of the other two royalty and tax regimes 
considered. However, the share of net returns accruing to the province is now typically more sensitive to 
revenue and expenditure shocks, especially as far as changes in WTI prices and the Canada-US exchange 
rate are concerned. That being said, the provisions of the NRF are estimated to leave the Government of 
Alberta relatively less exposed to the consequences of revenue and expenditure shocks when WTI prices 
are at the low end rather than the high end of the range considered, especially as far as changes in capital 
expenditure are concerned. 
                                                 
17 On the breakdown of volumes and reserves according to production method, see AERCB (2009, Table 2.1, p. 2-
3).   22
 
 
TABLE 1 – Selected Provisions of Royalty and Tax Regimes Considered 
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TABLE 2 – Stylized Bitumen Production Projects: Key Assumptions 
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Figure 1. Estimated Discounted Cost and Revenue Per Barrel,
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Figure 2. Estimated Discounted Total Costs and NPV, 
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Figure 3a. Estimated Producer Share of NPV under 
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Figure 3b. Estimated Producer Share of NPV under 
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Figure 4a. Estimated Effects of Shocks on Per-barrel NPV, 
SAGD
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Figure 4b. Estimated Effects of Shocks on Per-barrel NPV, 
Surface Mine
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